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The Chinese Liberal Camp 
in Post-June 4th China 
This paper is aa assessment of Chinese liberal intellectuals in the two decades following June 4th. It provides an 
analysis of the intellectual development of Chinese liberal intellectuals; their attitudes toward the party-state, 
economic reform, and globalisation; their political endeavours; and their contributions to the project of 
constitutional democracy in China. 
Liberals in contemporary China understand liberalism in the classical sense as a political philosophy that con-siders individual liberty as the most important political 
goal and upholds principles such as legal protection of individ-
ual rights, the rule of law, and limitations on government 
power. For them, liberalism takes the form of political liberal-
ism for the support of liberal democracy over dictatorship, eco-. 
nomic liberalism for the support of private pwperty over gov-
ernment control, and social liberalism for the support of equal-
ity over privilege. China's liberals not only strive for individual 
&eedom and seek to replace the despotism of the Leninist 
party-state with liberal democracy, but also stand at the front-
line in the fight against social inequality, and champion the 
cause of the working class in the quest for a better life. 
The june 4th massacre was a major setback for the democ-
ratisation project in China, but the discourse on democracy 
has continued to flourish in defiance of the party-state. The 
massacre not only hurt Chinese intellectuals deeply, but also 
compelled some of them to reconsider the trajectory of 
China's political development and strategies for achieving 
the goal of democracy. It is in the process of this intense 
reflection that a number of Chinese intellectuals have 
achieved an intellectual breakthrough to fully embrace liber-
alism sin.ce the 1990s. This paper is an assessment of the 
thoughts and activities of Chinese liberals in the two 
decades after june 4th. It will provide an analysis on the 
emergence of the Chinese liberal camp, the latest intellectu-
al developments among Chinese liberals, and their contribu-
tions to the quest for constitutional democracy in China. Ol 
end to the healthy trend of politicalliberalisation inspired by 
democratic aspiration. Following the massacre, and in the 
wake of the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist Party 
( CCP) led by Deng Xiaoping took two resolute measures for 
survival: a ruthless purge of democratic forces in society and 
within the CCP on the one hand, and the introduction of 
"market economy" on the other. With the tremendous aid of 
capital, technology, and consumer markets facilitated by glob-
alisation, the post-totalitarian regime in China rapidly evolved 
into a new order of "Market-Leninism," a useful term coined 
by New York Times correspondent Nicholas Kristof that 
refers to a Leninist party-state sustained by a combination of 
relatively free-market economics and autocratic one-party 
rule. <2l In other words, it is an astonishing paradox that com-
bines previously incompatible elements of capitalism and 
Communism, which by definition aims at eliminating capital-
ISm. 
To the surprise of many throughout the world, this strange 
hybrid has produced an economic miracle parasitic on excep-
tionally low-cost production factors, the expanding global 
market, and imported technologies and expertise. The enor-
mous wealth generated'by this new prosperity has provided a 
much greater incentive for Chinese Communist power-hold-
ers to retain power, and more resources for them to co-opt 
other social groups and repress the opposition. The result has 
aRrh.e formation of th.e ch.inese 
liberal camp u.nder "Market-
Leninism· 
1. In the context of contemporary China, the terms "constitutional democracy" {xianzheng 
minzhli) and "liberal democracy" (ziyouzhuyi minzhli) are interchangeable, though the 
latter is rarely used. Since the term "democracy" has been widely abused and even 
used to justify one-party dictatorship, for the purpose of clarity Chinese liberals deliber-
ately choose the term constitutional democracy, referring to liberal democracy with not 
only regular multiparty elections but also separation of powers and the protection of 
individual rights provided by the constitution and other laws. "Constitutional democra-
cy" is often substituted with the term constitutionalism (xianzheng) as a short-hand, a 
common practice that originated in modern China and was especially prevalent during 
the Constitutional Democracy Movement (xianzheng yundong) in the I 940s. 
China's "reform era" was divided into two different phases by 
the june 4th massacre in 1989, which brought a premature 
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2. Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Sees 'Market-Leninism' as Way to Future," The New York 
Times, 6 September 1993. 
been a transition to and consolidation of "power elite capital-
ism" (quangui zibenzhuyr), in which the development of the 
cruellest version of capitalism is dominated by the 
Communist bureaucracy, leading to phenomenal economic 
growth on the one hand and endemic corruption, striking 
social inequalities, ecological degeneration, and skilful politi-
cal oppression on the other. This unexpected outcome has 
disheartened many democracy supporters, who worry that 
China's transition is "trapped" in a "resilient authoritarian-
ism" that can be maintained for the foreseeable future. (3) 
However, because it has produced unmanageably acute 
social tensions and new social and political forces that chal-
lenge the one-party dictatorship, Market-Leninism is not actu-
ally that resilient. In particular, social tensions have given rise 
to an amorphous but increasingly forceful wave of "rights 
defence movements" (weiquan yundong). <4l The most prom-
ising new political force engendered by Market-Leninism in 
China has been the formation of a liberal camp in the late 
1990s, consisting of at least six vaguely distinctive but to 
some extent overlapping categories: liberal intellectuals, liberM 
als within the CCP, Christian liberals, democracy activists, 
human rights lawyers, and grassroots rights activists. These 
six groups have advocated liberalism in their own perspectives 
through publications and speeches, have taken part in a vari-
ety of social and political activities for the cause of democra-
cy, have expressed mutual support for each other when per~ 
secuted by the party-state, and have occasionally united to 
issue joint petitions or open letters on the Internet to express 
their shared concerns or demands for democratic change. (Sl 
i'c.if~Liberal intellectuals and Liberals witltin 
tlte CCP 
The majority of intellectuals in China today are at least semi-
liberals in the sense that they share beliefs in market economy, 
individual rights, and to a lesser extent, liberal democracy, 
although only a tiny minority of them hold these liberal ideals 
profoundly enough to express them in a systematic way or are 
brave enough to put their beliefs into practice by actively con-
hooting the party-state. <6l A claim of a "rebirth" or "resurfac-
ing" of liberalism in China was made by Chinese liberals them-
selves in the late 1990s. According to some leading Chinese 
liberal intellectuals, one of the most important events in intel-
lectual circles in China in 1998 was the "open discourse" of 
liberalism after 50 years of silence. (7) Several factors con-
tributed to this new development of liberalism in China, includ-
ing expectations of change after Deng Xiaoping' s death, the 
Asian financial crisis rooted in authoritarianism, the perception 
that economic development necessitated further reforms, the 
provocative attacks on liberalism by the new left, awareness of 
the accelerating pace of globalisation, and the posture of Jiang 
Zemin's leadership in respect to human rights and rule of law, 
as shown by the political report of the Fifteenth Party 
Congress and the signing of the "International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" and the "International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."'"' 
The core of the emerging liberal camp is a group of middle-
age scholars who can be largely identified as members of the 
"Cultural Revolution Generation," including Zhu Xueqin, 
Xu Youyu, Qin Hui, He Weifang, Liu junning, Zhang 
Boshu, Sun Liping, Zhou Qiren, Wang Dingding and 
Zhang Weiying. Their conversion to liberalism is rooted in 
their own political experience as well as their exposure to lib-
eral theories. While their experience of. and reflections on 
totalitarian rule during the Cultural Revolution provided 
strong stimuli for them to search for a new political belief, in 
the 1970s they were intoxicated with the "heresy" of human-
ism of different sources, and since the 1980s they had been 
attracted to the liberal thinking of both Western sources and 
the liberal tradition of modern China. They have published 
their ideas in monographs, theoretical journals such as Dong 
Fang (Orient) and Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), newspa-
pers such as Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) and 
Nanfang Dushibao (Southern Metropolitan Daily), and 
more conveniently, on the Internet. The post-totalitarian 
3. Andrew ~ath_an~ "Aut~oritarian Resilience," Journal of Democracy, 14, no. 1, 2003, pp. 
6-17; Pe1 Mmxm, Chma's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, 
Harvard University Press, 2006. ' 
4. Wang. Yi, "2003: 'Xin minquan yundong' de faren he caolian" (2003: The origins and 
practices of the "new civil rights movement"), Guangcha {Observation), 19 December 
2003; He Weihua, "2006 nian weiquan yundong de fansi" (Reflections on the rights 
defence movement in 2006), http//www.peacehall.com/ news/ 
g?/pubvp/2007/01/200701180425.shtml; Teng Biao, "Zhongguo weiquan yundong 
mng hechu qu?" (Whither the rights defence movement in China?), http://www.peace-
hall.com/news/gb/pubvp/20061 0172340.shtm I. 
5. Due to length constraints and division of labour, this article focuses on liberal intellectu-
als and to a lesser extent on liberals within the CCP and Christian liberals. Analysis of 
democracy activists, rights lawyers, and grassroots activists is provided in other articles 
in this issue of the journal. 
6. The term "liberals" in this article refers to those absolute liberals who have established 
firm belief in philosophical, economic, and political liberalism and openly defend their 
beliefs in practice. 
7. Zhu Xueqin, "1998: Ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo" (Discourse on liberalism in China in 
~ 9_98), Na~ta~g ~ho_umo . (So~thern Weekend}, 25 December 1998; Liu Junning, 
Z1youzhuy1: JJUShl manda1de busuzhike"' {Liberalism: An "unexpected guest" of the 
1990s), Nantang zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 29 May 1999; Xu Youyu, "Ziyouzhuyi yu 
dangdai Zhongguo" (liberalism and contemporary China), Kaitang shidai(Open Times), 
no. 128, May/June 1999. 
8. For the impact of human rights discourse on China, see Merle Goldman From Comrade 
to. Citi~en: The Struggle tor Political Rights in China, Cambridge, 'Mass., Harvard 
Umvers1ty. Press, 2005; also Michael C. Davis (ed.), Human Rights and Chinese Values: 












© Michel Bonnin 
regime has prevented them from forming an organisation for 
their political endeavour, but they have managed to get 
together regularly at informal occasions and at conferences 
organised by liberal colleagues. C9l 
Zhu Xueqin, born in 1952, is a leading historian and public 
intellectual based at Shanghai University. He established his 
belief in liberalism through a thorough examination of the 
French Enlightenment in his PhD thesis and became a 
major exponent of contemporary Chinese liberalism. (IO) Xu 
Youyu, born in 1947, is a philosopher and public intellectu-
al based at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
Apart from his promotion of liberalism, Xu is also an expert 
on Western social theories, including Marxism and the 
Frankfurt School, and is a wel~known historian of the 
Cultural Revolution. ! Ill 
Qin Hui, born in 1953, is a historian and public intellectual 
based at Tsinghua University. Within the liberal camp, Qin 
stands out particularly for his advocacy of privatisation under 
strict conditions of democratic openness, the supremacy of 
social justice, and institutions of social democracy. <12) Wu 
Guoguang, born in 1958, is a political scientist and public 
intellectual currently based at the Univer~ity of Victoria after 
receiving his PhD from Princeton University and working at 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong for many years. Wu's 
earlier experience as an editor for People's Daily and a 
member of the Political System Reform Research Office 
serving then-Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang provided him 
with special insights into Chinese politics. (Ill He Weifang, 
born in 1960, is a professor of law and public intellectual 
based at Peking University, who rigorously advocates judicial 
independence and modernisation of the entire Chinese judi-
cial system in accordance with the principles of the rule of 
law. <14) Liu junning, born in 1961, is a political scientist and 
public intellectual currently based at the Institute of Chinese 
Cultural Studies after he was dismissed from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences due to his expression of liberal 
views. Liu has played a leading role in spreading the concept 
of constitutional government and in organising several liber-
al journals and book series such as Gonggong Luncong (Res 
Publica) and Minzhu Yicong {Translated Works on 
Democracy). os> Zhang Boshu, born in 1955, is a philoso-
pher and public intellectual based at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences. Among liberal intellectuals in China 
today, Zhang goes the farthest in directly confronting the 
Communist autocracy and promoting liberal-democratic 
alternatives in a systematic way. <16l Sun Liping, born in 
1955, is a sociologist and public intellectual based at 
Tsinghua University. Sun is well known for his criticism .of 
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the divisions in the current social system and his advocacy of 
transformation into an open and liberal society. (I l l Zhou 
Qiren (born in 1950), Wang Dingding (born in 1953), and 
Zhang Weiying (born in 1959) are like-minded economists 
and public intellectuals based at Peking University, sharing 
an emphasis on private property rights. 06l 
9. The first exdusive conference for Chinese liberals was organised by Feng Chongyi at 
University of Technology, Sydney, on Constitutional Government and China, January 
2003, leading to the publication of the book series Zhongguo ziyouzhuy/ luncong 
(Chinese Liberalism Series). · 
10. For Zhu's liberal ideas see Zhu Xueqin, Daode lixiang guo de fumfe (Downfall of the 
moral utopia), Shanghai, 5anlian, 2004; and Zhu Xueqin, Shuzhai/1 de geming (The rev-
olution in the study), Changchun, Changchun Publishing House, 1999. 
11. For Xu's liberal ideas see Xu Youyu, Ziyou de yanshuo (Discourse on liberalism), 
Changchun, Changchun Publishing House, 1999. 
12. For Qin's liberal ideas, see Oin Hoi, Wenti yu zhuyi (Issues and -isms), Changchun, 
Changchun publishing House, 1999; and Qin Hui, Shijian ziyou {Practising liberalism), 
Hangzhou, Zhejiang People's Publishing House, 2004. 
13. For Wu's liberal ideas, see Wu Guoguang, Ziyouhua, zhlduhua he minzhuhua 
(liberalization, institutionalization, and democratisation), Taipei, Storm Forum Press, 
1997; Wu Guoguang, The Anatomy of Political Power In China, Singapore, Marshal! 
Cavendish Academic, 2005. 
14. For He's liberal ideas, see He Weifang, Sifa de 1/nlan yu zhldu (The judicial ideals and 
institutions), Beijing, Chinese University of Political Science and Law Publishing House, 
1998; and He Weifang, Yunsong zhengyi de fangshi (The ways to carry justice), 
Shanghai, 5anlian Books, 2003. 
15. For Liu's liberal ideas, see Liu Junning, Minzhu, gonghe xianzheng: Ziyouzhuyi sixiang 
yanjiu (Democracy, republicanism, and constitutional government: A study on liberal-
ism), Shanghai, Sanlian Books, 1998. 
16. For Zhang's liberal ideas, see Zhang Boshu, Zhongguo xlanzheng ga/ge kexingxing yan-
jiu baogao (A study of the feasibility of constitutional democracy reform in China), Hong 
Kong, Chenzhong Books, 2008; and Zhang Bos~u. Gong wusi dao liusi: 20 shiji zhong-
guo zhuanzhizhuyi pipan (From May 4 to June 4: Criticism on Chinese despotism in the 
twentieth century), Hong Kong, Che01hong Books, 2008. 
17. For Sun's liberal ideas, see Sun Uping, Boyi: Duanlie shehui de /iyi chongtu yu hexie 
(Contestations: Conflict of interests and social harmony in a divided society), Beijing, 
Social Sciences Academic Press, 2006. 
18. For their liberal ideas, see Zhou Qiren, Chanquan yu zhidu bianqlan(Property rights and 
institutional change), Beijing, Peking University Press 2005; Wang Dingding, Yongyuan 
de paihuai (Wavering forever), Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2002; and 
Zhang Weiying , Qiye lilun yu zhongguo qiye gaige (Enterprise theory and enterprise 
reform in China), Beijing, Peking University Press, 1999, p.33. 
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Liberal intellectuals have forged close alliances with liberals 
within the CCP, usually known as "dangnei minzhupat' 
(democrats within the CCP). <19l Liberals within the CCP 
usually choose to speak to the top party leadership in a 
coded language familiar to the Communist bureaucracy. 
They also have special outlets for publishing their ideas, 
such as Yanhuang chunqiu (Chronicles of China), 
Tongzhou gongjin (Advance in the same boat), and 
Zhongguo shichang jingji luntan wengao (Chinese market 
economy forum drafts), the journals under their control. 
Most active members of this group are retired officials, 
including Du Daozheng, director of Yanhuang chunqiu, for-
mer director of the State Press Bureau and former chief edi-
tor of Guangming Daily, Du Guang, former director of the 
Research Office and the Librarian at the CCP's Central 
Party School; He Jiadong ( 1923-2006), former deputy 
director of Workers' Press; Hu Jiwei, former chief editor 
and director of People's Daily; Jiang Ping, former president 
of the Chinese University of Political Science and Law; Li 
Rui, vice-minister of the Ministry of Water Conservancy in 
the 1950s and deputy chief of the Organization Department 
of the CCP Central Committee in the 1980s; Li Shenzhi 
( 1923-2003), former vice-president of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences; Ren Zhongyi (1914-2005), 
former Party Secretary of Guangdong Province; Wu 
]inglian, senior research fellow at the Development 
Research Centre of the State Council; Xie Tao, former vice-
president of Renmin University; Yang Jisheng, deputy direc-
tor of Yanhuang chunqiu and former senior journalist of 
Xinhua News Agency and chief editor of Chinese Markel; 
and Zhu Houze, former Party Secretary of Guizhou 
Province and chief of the Propaganda Department of the 
CCP Central Committee. Indeed, liberals within the CCP 
have used their positions to create space for discourse on lib-
eralism, and played a key role in the resurgence of liberalism 
in China in the late 1990s. 
i!::'!ch.rlstlan Hberals 
The emergence of Christian liberals is a new phenomenon in 
the social and political landscape of China in the first decade 
disappointment with the failure of the Chinese democracy 
movement and the endless infighting among its leaders in 
exile, he was converted to Christianity in 1991 while a visit-
ing scholar at Princeton University. With his 12-part VCD 
Why Do I Believe in jesus Christ circulating widely in China 
at the time, Yuan's conversion sent shock waves among his 
colleagues in the Chinese democracy movement. 
Equally influential was the conversion of Yang Xiaokai 
( 1948-2004), a forerunner of the Chinese democracy move-
ment who was well known during the Cultural Revolution for 
his profound big-character poster Zhongguo xiang hechu qu 
{Whither China), circulated in 1968 when he was 19 years 
old. Yang earned his PhD in economics from Princeton 
University in 1988, became a well-known neoclassical econ-
omist at Monash University, and was twice nominated for the 
Nobel Prize in Economics (in 2002 and 2003). For his 
Chinese audience, Yang is of particular significance in pro-
moting xianzheng jingjixue (constitutional economics), which 
champions the views that constitutional democracy provides 
the best foundation for economic development. (20l 
In the last few years, many liberal intellectuals have convert-
ed to Christianity and become leaders in the fast expanding 
"house church" (jiating jiaohw) movement, which has an 
estimated membership of 50-80 million. (l l) Chinese "house 
churches," also known as the "underground" church or the 
"unofficial" church (although they do not belong to a single 
denomination but operate separately), are assemblies of 
unregistered Chinese Christians independent of the Three-
Self Patriotic Movement, the government-run Christian 
19. See Feng Chongyi, "U Shenzhi he zhonggong dangnel ziyou minzhu pai" (U Shenzhi and 
liberal democrats within the Chinese Communist Party), in Feng Chongyi (ed.), Li 
Shenzhi yu ziyouzhuyi zai zhongguo de mingyun (Li She01hl and the fate of liberalism 
in China), Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences, 2004, pp. 121-146; and Feng Chongyi, 
"Democrats within the Chinese Communist Party Since 1989." Journal of Contemporary 
China, vol.17, no. 57, November 2008, pp. 673-688. 
20. Yang Xiaokai, "Jingji gaige yu xianzheng zhuanxing" (Economic reform and transforma-
tion to constitutional democracy), http://www.tech.cn/data/08/07/2004. 
QJ 
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of the twenty-first century. The journey from politics to 
Christianity among Chinese democracy activists started with 
Yuan Zhiming, who gained renown as one of the three 
authors of the influential political television series River 
E ~. legy, aired in 1988. As a PhD candidate in philosophy at Yu Jianrong, "Jidujiao de fazhan yu zhongguo shehui wending" [Development of Christianity and social stability in China), http://bbs.okhere. net/thread·928875·1-
1.html; Yu Jie, "Zhongguo dangdai zhishifenzi de guixin licheng" (The conversion of 
intellectuals to Christians in contemporary China), In Yu Jie, Bai zhou jiangjin (Daylight 
approaching), Hong Kong, Chenzhong Books, 2008, pp. 241-249. 
Renmin University, Yuan escaped to the United States in 
1989 after the june 4th massacre, and following profound 
__ 3._3.__ -1 










organisation. <ZZ) "House churches" operate outside of gov-
ernment regulations and restrictions, but they are not official-
ly outlawed. Their leaders and members are often harassed 
by government officials, ·mainly for fear of popular mobilisa-
tion outside of government control. 
Active Christian liberals include Yu Jie (born in 1973), one 
of China's most independent and outspoken writers and 
social critics, who earned his MA in Chinese literature from 
Peking University in 2000 after publishing six books, served 
as Secretary General of the Independent Chinese Pen 
Center for one term, and has published more than 20 books 
on Chinese political, social, and cultural issues; Ai Xiaoming 
(born in 1953), a professor in Chinese literature, well-known 
feminist, and public intellectual based at Zhongshan 
University; Wang Yi (born in 1973), a lecturer in law at 
Chengdu University, who earned his undergraduate degree 
in law from Sichuan University and has become one of the 
most influential Chinese public intellectuals with expertise in 
legal studies; Fan Yafeng (born in 1969), a research fellow at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, where he earned 
his PhD in Law; Wang Dongcheng, a professor in Chinese 
Literature at Chinese Youth Political College; Fu Guoyong 
(born in 1967), a freelance writer and public intellectual who 
was imprisoned five times for his political commentaries dur-
ing 1989-1998; Qi Yanchen, another freelance writer and 
public intellectual who was imprisoned for four years for his 
political commentaries; Ren Bumei (born in 1967), a free-
lance writer who was probably the first to argue the case for 
"theological liberalism" in contemporary China; Wang 
Guangze (born in 1972), a freelance writer who earned his 
first degree in law from Henan University and an MA in 
Philosophy from Renmin University, but lost his positions, 
one after another, as editor and journalist at Xinyang Daily, 
Legal Daily, 21st Century Economic Herald, and Phoenix 
Weekly due to his dissenting views; and Zan Aizong (born 
1969), a freelance writer who was dismissed by Chinese 
Ocean Daily in Augnst 2006 after reporting on the case of 
police demolishing a four-storey "house church" in Xiaoshan, 
Zhejiang Province on 29 july 2006. These Christian liberals 
publish journals such as Fangzhou (Ark) and Lingshan 
(Holy Mountain), which discuss religion-related political 
issues as well as Christian beliefs. 
..-rne th.eoreticaL soph.lstication 
of Ch.lnese Llberaltsm 
The comprehensive purge of "bourgeois liberal elements" by 
the hard-line CCP leadership after 1986, and particularly in 
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the wake of the June 4th massacre, meant that liberal ele-
ments became weaker in the establishment in the early 
1990s. However, the loss has been compensated by the 
greater depth of liberal beliefs, the sophistication of liberal 
theory, and the expansion of liberalism into the greater soci-
ety since the mid-1990s. Six theoretical breakthroughs in 
Chinese liberalism can be readily identified: abandoning 
Marxism and embracing liberalism as the guiding ideology; 
refuting Chinese despotism as embodied by the communist 
party-state; replacing rule by law ( ) with rule of law ( ); 
addressing issues of social justice; formulating liberal ideas 
into concrete programs for democratisation; and transcend-
ing nationalism. em 
Abandonlng Marxlsm and embraclng 
llberallsm as tlte guldlng ldeology 
The open break with the Marxist framework and embrace 
of liberalism in China is quite an achievement. We know 
that Chinese "liberal elements" in the 1980s, including 
profound thinkers such as Wang Ruoshui, Su Shaozhi, and 
Yan Jiaqi, were confined to the Marxist framework in their 
quest for democracy, typically expressed as "socialist 
democracy and legality." This limitation has been over-
come by Chinese liberals since the late 1990s, when Li 
Shenzhi, a senior Communist expert on international 
affairs and former vice-president of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, a vice-ministerial rank, solemnly 
averred: 
After 300 years of comparison and selection in the 
whole world since the age of industrialization, and 
particularly after more than I 00 years of Chinese 
experimentation, the largest in scale in human histo-
ry, there is sufficient evidence to prove that liberalism 
is the best and universal value. Today's revival of the 
liberal tradition stemming from Peking University will 
22. The organisation was founded in the early 1950s by a group of government officials and 
church leaders who were sympathetic to the new Communist regime. It took its name 
from the principles of self-government, self-propagation, and self-support, which for-
eign missionaries years before had set forth as goals for the Chinese Church. Thousands 
of Chinese Christians refused to join the government-run organisation, precisely 
because they wanted to maintain their independence and the principles of self-govern-
ment, self-propagation, and self-support. After 1955 these independent Christians were 
either killed or jailed by the government. The first Chinese "house church" was founded 
by a senior priest, Yuan Xiangchen, in Beijing in 1980, when he was released after 21 
years of imprisonment. 
23. Feng Chongyi, "The Return of Liberalism and Social Democracy: Breaking through the 
Barriers of State Socialism, Nationalism, and Cynicism in Contemporary China," Issues 
& Studies, 39:3 (September 2003), pp. 1-31; Feng Chongyi, "Democrats within the 
Chinese Communist Party Since 1989," op. cit. 
beyond doubt guarantee the emergence of a liberal 
China in the world of globalization.'"' 
In official publications, this was the first time in the history of 
the People's Republic of China that an ideological system of 
liberalism was asserted as the gniding ideology for China, 
notably by a high-ranking CCP official, although many con-
cepts of liberalism, freedom of speech in particular, had been 
advocated by pioneers of the Chinese democracy movement 
such as Chen Ziming, Hu Ping, and Chen Kuide since the 
turn of 1980s. "''After the publication of this declaration, Li 
Shenzhi quickly emerged as an opinion leader and mentor of 
Chinese liberals, who rapidly surfaced as a visible force in the 
intellectual and political arena. cz6J Zhu Xueqin summarised 
the propositions of Chinese liberalism as follows: 
Empiricism is its philosophy, as opposed to apriorism; 
the evolutionary theory based on the process of trial 
and error is its concept of history, as opposed to any 
kind of historicism; gradualism is its strategy for 
change and development, as opposed to radicalism; it 
supports the market mechanism in economics, as 
opposed to a planned economy; it demands represen-
tative democracy, constitutional government, and the 
rule of law in politics, as opposed to mass dictatorship 
by the majority in the name of "general will" or dic-
tatorship by one man or oligarchy; in ethics it 
demands protection of individuals, holding that an 
individual cannot be further reduced to anything else 
and cannot. be sacrificed for any abstract goals. (ll) 
!ff~}¥i!Y~Rejectlng Clllnese despotlsm as embodled 
by CCP rule 
Their conversion to liberalism also means that Chinese lib-
erals are no longer confined to so-called "socialist democra-
cy" guaranteeing the leading role of the CCP. The experi-
ence of the June 4th crackdown and the collapse of 
Communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe provided an opportunity for Chinese liberals to 
deeply reflect on the illusion of "socialist democracy,'' and 
they awakened to the fact that the party-state had been 
deceiving itself and others in claiming Communist one-party 
rule as a higher form of "democracy.'' They sharply pointed 
out that the CCP under Mao's leadership overthrew the 
Nationalist dictatorship only to supplant it with the CCP's 
dictatorship, and Mao's successors, the post-Tiananmen 
leadership, had maintained the despotic system and become 
even more corrupt. Since the 1990s, based on their new-
found conviction that one-party dictatorship and democracy 
are incompatible, Chinese liberals have categorically aban-
doned one-party rule for constitutional democracy with all its 
standard features, including multi-party elections, legal safe-
guards for human rights by limiting the power of the govern-
ment, and a system of checks and balances between the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial branches. (lB) 
The achievement and consensus resulting from the theoreti-
cal exploration of Chinese liberalism during the last two 
decades is summarised in Charter 08 ( 08 Xianzhang) which 
has been signed by more than 8,000 Chinese citizens of all 
walks since its publication on the Internet on 10 December 
2008. It calls on Chinese to "embrace universal human val-
ues, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and build a 
democratic system" as an alternative to one-party dictator-
ship; it provides succinct exposition of six basic liberal values 
and concepts: freedom, human rights, equality, republican-
ism, democracy, and constitutional rule; and it sets forth lib-
eral positions on 19 major issues for political reform: a new 
constitution, separation of powers, legislative democracy, an 
24. Li Shenzhi, "Hongyang Beida de ziyouzhuyi chuantong" (Promoting and developing the 
liberal tradition of Peking University), in Liu Junning (ed.), Ziyouzhuyi de xiansheng: 
Beida chuantong yu jinxiandai Zhongguo (The harbinger of liberalism: The tradition of 
Peking University and modern China), Beijing, Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1998, 1-5. 
Similar ideas had been put forward by others earlier, albeit with much less impact. For 
example, see Xu Liangying, "Renquan guannian he xiandai minzhu lilun" (The concept 
of human rights and modern theory of democracy), Tanshuo {Exploration), August 1993; 
also in Xu Liangying, Kexue minzhu Jixing: Xu Liangying wenji (Science, democracy, and 
reason: Selected works of Xu Liangying), New York, Mirror Books, 2001, pp. 258-276. 
25. Chen Ziming, "Zouxiang xianzheng minzhu: Yige 'siwu ren' de xinlu Jicheng" (Advancing 
toward constitutional democracy: Mental development of a member of the "April 4th" 
generation), in Chen Zihua, et a!., Yuhuo chongsheng: Tiananmen heishou beiwanglu 
(Rebirth: Memorandum of Tiananmen blackhands), New York, Mirror Books, 2004, pp. 
58-93; Hu Ping, "Lun yanlun ziyou" (On freedom of speech), Oishi niandai (The 1970s), 
no. 3-6, 1981; Chen Kuide, Xin Ziyou (New liberalism), Huadong Chemical Industry 
Institute Publishing House, 1988. 
26. See Zhu Xueqin, "1998: Ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo" (Discourse on liberalism in 1998), 
in Zhu Xueqin, Shuzai li de geming (A revolution in the study), Changchun, Changchun 
Publishing House, 1999, pp. 380-398. Original!y published in Nanfang Zhoumo 
(Southern Weekend), 25 December 1998. 
27. Zhu Xueqin, "1998: Ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo" (Discourse on liberalism in 1998), op. 
cit., p. 381. 
28. Hu Jiwei, "Xin chun fang yan: yige lao gongchandang yuan de shensi " (Unrestrained 
comments at new spring: Reflections by a senior member of the CCP), Beijing zhi chun 
(Beijing Spring), no. 34, March 1996, pp. 6-14; Hu Jiwei, "Mingbian xingshuai zhilu, 
huainian Hu Zhao xin zheng" (Understanding the causes of the rise and decline in com-
memoration of new undertakings by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang), 
http://www.ncn.org/asp/ zwginfo/12/1/2005; Li Rui, "Yingjie xin siji yao sijiang" (Four 
stresses to usher in the new century), Yanhuang chunqiu (Chronicles of China), no. 12, 
1999, p. 5; Li Shenzhi, "Frfty years of storms and disturbance," China Perspectives, no. 
32 (November-December 2000), pp. 5-12; Guan Shan, "Ren Zhongyi tan Deng Xiaoping 
yu Guangdong gaige kaifang" (Ren Zhongyi's talks on Deng Xiaoping and the reform and 
opening in Guangdong), Tongzhou Gongjin (Advance in the same boat), no.8, 2004, pp. 
6-14; Xie Tao, "Minzhu shehui zhuyi moshi yu zhongguo qiantu" (The model of demo-
cratic socialism and the future of China), Yanhuangchunqiu (Chronicles of China), no. 2, 

















independent judiciary, public control of public servants and 
separation of the military from political parties, guarantees of 
human rights, election of public officials, rural-urban equali-
ty, freedom of association~ freedom of assembly, freedom of 
expression, freedom of religion, civic education, protection 
of private property, financial and tax reform, social security, 
protection of the environment, a federated republic, and 
truth and reconciliation. (Z9l 
fli~~~Replaclng rule by law witlt rule of law 
Debate arose between "rule of law" and "rule of man" (ren-
zhr) in China in the late 1970s, when intellectuals in gener-
al and the ruling elite in particular wanted to put an end to 
the sufferings caused by Mao's personal dictatorship and the 
lawless practices of the Cultural Revolution. The result was 
"socialist legality," under which dozens of laws were enacted 
and a court system was rebuilt. The 1990s witnessed a new 
debate between "rule of law" and "rule by law." According 
to Chinese liberals, so-called "socialist legality" is at best 
"rule by law," in which the law is used by the party-state as 
an instrument to control society, while the Party itself exer~ 
cises its power above the law and is not subject to the law. 
Since then, tremendous efforts have been made by Chinese 
liberals to promote the concept of "rule of law," in which 
everyone, the government in particular, is subject to the law, 
and government power is limited by law, with the result that 
individual rights are effectively protected by the law against 
the abuse of the government in particular. ooJ Due to the 
efforts of Chinese liberals and other legal scholars, the CCP 
leadership has also abandoned the concept of "rule by law" 
for the concept of "rule of law" since 1997. llll It is in the 
process of this debate that the concept of constitutional gov~ 
ernment (xianzheng) has been revived and incorporated into 
the common vocabulary of formal publications in China. In 
2003, when the Chinese constitution was undergoing a 
major revision, participants in both official and unofficial 
conferences on constitutional revision called for replacing 
the concept of renmin minzhu zhuanzheng (people's demo-
cratic dictatorship) in the constitution with the concept of 
renmin minzhu xianzheng (people's democratic constitution-
al rule). '1" 
?~~W~lAddressing issues of social justice 
The Chinese new left have labelled Chinese liberals as 
"neo-liberals," causing grave confusion and misunderstand~ 
ing. (33l Even some China scholars in the West assume as a 
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matter of course that the cause of social justice is champi-
oned by China's new left and neglected by Chinese liberals. 
The Chinese new left actually includes three groups of peo-
ple: nationalists, populists, and neo-Marxists/post-mod-
ernists. The nationalist group can be further broken down 
into two subgroups: xenophobes, who borrow theoretical 
weapons from postcolonial criticism and blame the invasion 
of Western goods, Western capital, and Western values for 
the escalation, if not creation, of inequalities and other vices 
in contemporary China; (l4l and statists, who argue for an 
agenda of "state capacity," and who not only regard China's 
national pride and sovereign state power as being sacrificed 
in an economy increasingly dependent on world capitalism, 
but also perceive dangers posed by the process of economic 
decentralisation undermining the fiscal, economic, and polit-
ical power of the central government in addressing inequali-
ties in Chinese society and in maintaining national unity. {35l 
The populist group, mainly literary critics, spares no effort in 
exposing the "social polarisation" (/iangji fenhua), "inequal-
ities" (shehui bujun), and "spiritual degeneration" (jingshen 
duoluo) brought about by market reforms and capitalist 
29. See "China's Charter 08," translated from the Chinese by Perry Link, The New York 
Review of Books, vol. 56, No.1, 15 January 2009. 
30. See He Weifang, Sifa de linian yu zhidu (The judicial ideals and institutions), Beijing, 
Chinese University of Political Science and Law Publishing House, 1998; Liu Junning, 
Minzhu, gonghe xianzheng: Ziyouzhuyi sixiang yanjiu (Democracy, republicanism, and 
constitutional government: A study on liberalism), Shanghai, Sanlian Books, 1998; Jiang 
Ping, Wo suo neng zuo de shi nahan (Crying out is what I can do), Beijing, China Law 
Publishing House, 2007; Wu Jinglian, Huhuan fazhi de shichang jingji (Calling for mar-
ket econo·my under the rule of law), Bejing, Sanlian Books, 2007. 
31. Li Buyun and Li Qing,"Cong 'fazhi' dao 'fazhi' ershi nian gai yi zi" (From "the rule by law" 
to "the rule of law": Twenty years is taken to change one word}, Faxue (Legal Studies), 
1999, no. 7; Institute of Legal Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, (ed.), 
Zhongguo tazhi 30 nian, 1978-2008 [fhe rule of law in China, 1978-2008), Beijing, 
Social Sciences Academic Press, pp. 59·70. 
32. For the summary of an official conference held in Beijing on 5 June 2003, see Wu 
Jinglian, et al., "14 wei xuezhe guanyu xinxian de sikao" (Thoughts of fourteen scholars 
on constitution revision), http.peacehall.com/ news/gb/china/200307200115.shtml; for 
the summary of an unofficial conference held in Qingdao on 18-19 June 2003, see 
Zhong Dajun, "Yushi jujin xiuxian, zouxiang minzhu xianzheng" (Keeping pace with the 
times in constitution revision and advancing toward constitutional democracy), 
http://www.dajun.com.cn/ xiuxianwz.htm. 
33. For details see Feng Chongyi, "The Third Way: The Question of Equity as a Bone of 
Contention Between Intellectual Currents," Contemporary Chinese Thought, 34:4, 
Summer 2003, pp. 75-93. 
34. For the three most aggressive attacks, see Song Oiang, Zhang Zangzang, and Qiao Bian, 
Zhongguo keyi shuo bu (China can say no), Hong Kong, Mingpao Publishing, 1996; Li 
Xiguang et al., Zai yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou {Behind the scenes of demonizing 
China), Beijing, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1996; and Fang Ning et al., 
Quanqiuhua yinying xia de Zhongguo zhifu (China's road under the shadow of globaliza-
tion) Beijing, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1999. For a wider discussions on 
nationalism in China today, see also Minzu zhuyi yu zhuanxing qi Zhongguo de mingyun 
(Nationalism and the fate of China in transition), Li Shitao (ed.), Changchun, Shidai Wenyi 
Publishing House, 2000. 
35. See, for example, Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao 
{Report on China's state capacity), Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
modernity. (36l The neo-Marxist (or post-modernist) group is 
the most sophiSticated of the three. Borrowing neo--Marxist, 
post-modernist, and post-colonial critique from the West, 
utilising class-based discourse, and raising the issues of social 
justice, class exploitation, and the hegemony of global 
(Western) capital, they have effectively problematised the 
Chinese quest for Enlightenment values (such as liberty and 
rationality), modernity, and globalisation. They fiercely 
attack liberalism as if it were the mainstream ideology 
responsible for social injustice and other evils. (J7l These 
groups are labelled "the new left" mainly because they bor-
row theories and vocabulary almost exclusively from the new 
left in the West. However, while their patrons in the West 
perform a healthy function of social and cultural criticism to 
balance the excesses of neo--liberalism or market fundamen-
talism, the new left in China obscures China's real problems 
by transplanting incongruous dogmas developed in a funda-
mentally different context. 
Chinese liberals are, in fact, tackling China's burning issues, 
including the problem of growing social inequality. Not only 
do Chinese liberals do their utmost to advocate market effi-
ciency, liberty, democracy, and rule of law, they also began 
taking great pains to promote social justice, well before the 
new left took up the issue; not only do they advocate equal-
ity of opportunity and procedural justice, they also stand for 
distributive justice to a great extent. 08l The social democrat 
elements within the liberal camp in particular closely follow 
the tradition of utopian liberal political economy with great 
enthusiasm in the egalitarian mode of the welfare state. 
However, in tackling the issues of equity and inequality, 
Chinese liberals differ from both the Chinese old and new 
left in two fundamental ways. First, the liberals see the 
despotic political system, as well as the resulting marketisa-
tion of political power in the process of transition to the mar-
ket economy (rather than the market economy per se), as 
the primary source of inequality, including unequal distribu-
tion of wealth. Based on the observation that power-holders 
have abused their power for "yuanshi jib"' (previous accu-
mulation), He Qinglian came to the conclusion that unfair 
distribution in China today does not manifest itself in the 
distribution of national income (through wages or taxes), but 
mainly in the allocation and possession of resources through 
political power. (39l 
Another liberal, Zhu Xueqin, argues: 
Current social evils in China cannot be simplified and 
equated with a "western disease" or "market dis-
ease. " They are a "Chinese disease" and a "power 
disease" resulting from the peculiar circumstances 
where the market mechanism is parasitised, distorted, 
and even suppressed by an outmoded power mecha-
nism. The liberals raised the issue of social justice 
long before the new left did, and they dug deeper to 
the root of the problem, pointing out that the problem 
already existed in the Mao era, such as in the plun-
dering of private property, possession of public prop-
erty, and suppression of dissenting political views by 
the privileged stratum. These social injustices took 
shape from the inception of that system, but had been 
covered up by Mao's illusory ideology of egalitarian-
ism. The power mechanism has not changed with the 
introduction of the market mechanism, but rather has 
increased its privileges and augmented the scope of 
rent-seeking. The result is structural corruption and 
social injustice at an unprecedented level. (40l 
Second, based on empirical evidence linking economic and 
political freedoms, and the experience of suffering inflicted 
by the Communist "command economy," the liberals have 
not waged an all-out war against the market, capitalism, and 
the "middle class" as the left has, but rather firmly defend 
the market and the "middle class" while focusing their 
36. For a typical example, see Han Yuhai, "Zai ziyouihuyi zitai de beihou" (Behind the liber-
al pose), Tianya (Frontiers), no. 5, 1998; Han Yuhai, "Women shifou yao jieshou yige 
tongzhihua shijie" (Do we need to accept the world of uniformity), Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-
first Century), no. 54, August 1999; and Han Yuhai, "Ziyouzhuyi de lilun pinfa" (Poverty 
of the liberalist theory), Yazhou yuekan (Asia Monthly), no. 1, 2000. See also Liang 
Xiaosheng, Zhongguo shehui ge Jieceng fenxi (An analysis of social strata in China), 
Beijing, Economic Daily Publishing House, 1997. 
37. Wang Hui, "Dangdai Zhongguo sixiang zhuangkuang yu xiandaixing" (The state of 
thought in contemporary China and modernity), 7ianya, no. 5, 1997; Wang Hui, "Guanyu 
xiandaixing wenti dawen" (Questions and answers about modernity), ibid., no. 1, 1999. 
38. Qin Hui (Bian Wu), "Gongzheng zhishang lun" (On the supremacy of justice), Dongfang 
(Orient), 1994:6; Qin Hui {Sian Wu), "Zailun gongzheng zhishang: Oidian gongzheng ruhe 
keneng" (The second essay on the supremacy of justice: Possibility of justice at the 
starting point), Dongfang (Orient), 1995:2; Qin Hui (Sian Wu), "Gongzheng, jiazhi lixing 
yu fan fubai: Sanlun gongzheng zhishang' (Justice, value rationality and anti-corruption: 
The third essay on the supremacy of justice}, Dongfang (Orient), 1995:6; Oin Hui (Bian 
Wu), "Gongzheng wei daode zhiji" (Justice as the foundation of morality: The fourth 
essay on the supremacy of justice), Dongfang (Orient), 1996:5; Oin Hui, "Shehui 
gongzheng yu zhongguo gaige de jingyan jiaoxun" (Social justice and the lessons of 
reform in China}, in Qin Hui, Went/ yu Zhuyi (Issues and -isms), Changchun, Changchun 
Publishing House, 1999, pp. 33-40; Xu Youyu, "Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo" 
(Liberalism and contemporary China}, Kaitang Shidai (Open times), 1999:3, pp. 43-51; 
Xu Youyu, "Ziyouzhuyi, falankefu xuepai ji qita" (liberalism, the Frankfurt School and 
others), in Xu Youyu, Ziyoude Yanshuo (Liberal discourse), Changchun Publishing House, 
1999, pp. 305·318; Zhu Xueqin, "1998: Ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo" (Discourse on lib-
eralism in China in 1998), Zhu Xueqin, Shuzai fi de geming (Revolution in the study), 
Changchun, Changchun Publishing House, 1999, pp. 380-399. 
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Publishing House, 1998, p. 4. 
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attacks on the unjust power structure of the Leninist party-
state and the "upstarts" (baofahu) who profit from the abuse 
of political power. It is the belief of Chinese liberals that uni-
versal protection of rights, including property rights, is the 
foundation of social justice. Xu Youyu points out that "the 
new left pick up other people's phrases to attack marketisa-
tion, ignoring the positive effect of marketisation in breaking 
down the oppressive old system." According to him, what 
should be done is to protect the interests of working people 
against "bigwig privatisation" ( quangui siyouhua) through 
the creation of a just legal framework to regulate the market 
and human behaviour. C41l 
Qin Hui argues that since social injustice in China today is 
rooted in an unfair process of competition where some abuse 
political power to create and accumulate wealth while others 
lose out, "what is important is that there should be a simul-
taneous process of taking away both the constraints and the 
protections of the old system, thereby avoiding a situation in 
which some people continue to enjoy protection after remov-
ing constraints while others continue to suffer from the con-
straints after losing the protections, and in which opportuni-
ties are monopolised by the former while risks are taken by 
the latter, and the former take the 'fruits' while the latter pay 
the price." <421 
Zhu Xueqin summarises the liberal solution to combating 
the sacial evil of inequality as follows: 
Liberalism aims to deepen market-oriented reform 
while opposing any attempt to plunder, in the name 
of economic reform, the social wealth accumulated 
from the contributions of the lower strata of society, 
and opposing any attempt to repeat the experience of 
Land Reform and Boxer-style bogus nationalism. The 
economic reform of the past 20 years has not been 
accompanied by corresponding political reform to bal-
ance power, hence the accumulation of social injus-
tice. The only way out is to establish constitutional 
democracy and rule of law through political reform, 
rather than Falling back into the trap of campaigns and 
mass movements as in the past. (HJ 
~~~~Formulating concrete programs for tlte 
transltion to constitutional democracy 
Chinese liberals within the CCP such as Shang Dewen, 
Fang ]ue, Du Guang, and Li Rui have made heart-felt pro-
posals to the Party leadership for a smooth political transi-
tion from within. The death of political strongman Deng 
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Xiaoping in early 1997 presented an opportunity for liberals 
to call for democratisation of the party-state. Shang Dewen 
is a senior professor in economics at Peking University, and 
also a "veteran revolutionary" (/aogeming) who joined the 
People's Liberation Army in the 1940s. In August 1997, 
when the 15th National Congress of the CCP was at the 
last stage of preparation, Shang Dewen sent the Central 
Committee of the CCP a proposal entitled Some Issues of 
the Political Reforms in China and Main Strategies. His 
proposals included revision of the constitution according to 
the demands of market economy, general elections and the 
establishment of parliamentary system, and checks and bal-
ances of powers - virtually the political system of liberal 
democracy as established in the West, which he regarded as 
"political civilisation" belonging to all humankind. In order 
to minimise resistance within the CCP, Shang Dewen prom-
ised that the backbone of the new political system would be 
the working class and the CCP. He also proposed allowing 
three years for preparation through consultation and discus-
sion and another 12 years to complete the process of politi-
cal transition to full democracy. Shang's proposal was not 
accepted by the CCP leadership, but led to many interviews 
and reports by international media. <44) 
When these calls for further political reform in the direction 
of democratisation fell on deaf ears among the "third gener-
ation of leadership" led by Jiang Zemin, democrats within 
the CCP turned their attention to the "fourth generation 
leadership" represented by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, who 
became the General Secretary of the CCP and the Prime 
Minister of the PRC, respectively, in early 2003. Before Hu 
and Wen assumed power in late 2002, Du Guang widely 
circulated a pamphlet of over I 00,000 words analysing the 
reality and causes of communist despotism in China and call-
ing for reforms to return enterprises to workers, land to-peas-
ants, government to citizens, and culture to society. 
Concretely, he asked the CCP leadership to eliminate all 
Party institutions and functions that overlapped with those of 
41. Xu Youyu, "Jiushi niandai de shehui sichao" (Intellectual trends in the 1990s), in Xu 
Youyu, Ziyoude Yanshuo (Liberal discourse), Changchun, Changchun Publishing House, 
1999, pp. 257,260. 
42. Oin Hui, "Shehui gongzheng yu xueshu liangxin" (Social justice and academic con-
science), in Li Shitao {ed.), Ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de tenhua 
(Debate on liberalism and the split in the Chinese world of thought), Shidai Wenyi 
Publishing House, 2000, pp. 395-396. 
43. Zhu Xueqin, "1998 ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo" (Discourse on liberalism in China in 
1998), Zhu Xueqin, Shuzai fi de geming (Revolution in the study), Changchun, 
Changchun Publishing House, 1999, pp. 389-390. 
44. Shang Dewen, Lun zhongguo de zhengzhi tizhi gaige (On reform of the political system 
in China), Hong Kong, Zhonghua Guoji Publishing House, 2003. 
the government, to deprive Party propaganda departments at 
all levels of censorship power, to abolish the power of the 
CCP to intervene in the internal affairs of "democratic par-
ties," to grant independence to the army by separating the 
Party from the army, to grant independence to "social organ-
isations" (particular the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions, Communist Youth League, and Federation of 
Women) by severing the Party's administrative and financial 
ties, to allow genuine multi-candidate elections, to endow the 
National People's Congress with genuine legislative power, 
to establish judicial independence, to guarantee freedom of 
speech and association, and to establish a new government 
structure. c4s) 
Following the same line of thinking, Li Rui introduced a pro-
posal for comprehensive democratisation at the 16th 
National Congress of the CCP in November 2002. In his 
document, Li Rui divided his suggestions into "democratisa-
tion of the Party" and "democratisation of the state." In the 
area of "democratisation of the Party," Li asked for institu-
tionalisation in strictly adhering to the rule of a maximum of 
two terms service for standing politburo members; multiple 
candidates for election to the Central Committee; competi-
tive elections for politburo members, standing politburo 
members, and the general secretary; freedom of speech 
within the Party; major decision through votes; and submis-
sion of the Party to the state constitution. In the area of 
"democratisation of the state," his requests included effec-
tive measures to guarantee the operation of the National 
People's Congress as the most authoritative organ of state 
and legislation, establishment of a "constitutional court" to 
safeguard all the rights stipulated in the constitution, judicial 
independence, promulgation of a law of political parties to 
clearly demarcate the power and responsibilities of the rul-
ing Communist Party and other parties, free elections for 
government at the township level, and restoration of peasant 
associations for rural residents to exercise equal citizens' 
rights. c46l 
ti;~~~ranscendlng natlonallsm 
Liberals in China today have achieved a much better under-
standing of the tension between liberalism and nationalism 
than their predecessors in modern China, prioritising human 
rights and individual freedom over national wealth and 
power (guojia Fuqiang). '4" A complicated and delicate rela-
tionship had existed between nationalism and liberalism in 
China since modern times, largely due to the different logic 
of these two ideologies as well as the extraordinary intellec-
tual and political history of modern China in confronting the 
dual challenges of democratisation and national salvation. 
Most liberals in modern China were nationalists at the same 
time. In promoting China's independence and modernisa-
tion, nationalism and liberalism were both utilised as part 
and parcel. When modern liberalism was first introduced to 
China, Yan Fu, father of Chinese liberalism, deliberately 
and masterfully transmuted it into statist programs, which 
were upheld by several generations of China liberals. <48l In a 
politically charged environment where nationalism has 
become the most important tool for legitimising the Leninist 
party-state, and where nationalist sentiment runs high among 
a population fed with highly selective information by the 
state propaganda apparatus, Chinese liberals warn against 
the potential dangers of nationalism in causing social disor-
der, in arousing xenophobia and chauvinism, in suppressing 
individual freedom and personal rights, and in sabotaging 
the project of democratisation and modernisation. C49l They 
stress that China's modern nationalism has been informed 
by a backward Sino-centrism that has held China back from 
learning from other civilisations and making progress, and 
they call for an end to fanatical populist nationalism (leftist 
xenophobia), which rejects liberal values in the name of 
patriotism and breeds hatred and violence against other 
nations. 
For liberals in contemporary China, the regime of the 
Leninist party-state has always been a combination of 
Communism and nationalism, in which national interests 
have been greatly distorted by vested interests, privilege, and 
the ruling ideology. Having established a firm belief in 
democracy and liberal values as the prerequisite for ''rational 
nationalism," they insist that no abstract "national interest" 
exists apart from the sum of individual interests of the mem-
bers of a nation, and that this kind of "national interest" can 
only be legitimised through the democratic process. They 
argue for the superiority of universal values over nationalism 
45. Du Guang, Jianshi gaige de shehui zhuyi tangxiang (Stick to the socialist direction of 
reforms), unpublished manuscript, 2002. 
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- peace, non-violence, democracy, rationality, freedom, and 
human rights in particular - and urge their compatriots to 
abide by these values "_'hen engaging in international rela-
tions. (lOJ 
Liberals in China protest against the cynical manipulation of 
nationalism by the party-state, especially for the purpose of 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the outmoded party-state 
regime. In Sun Liping's words, "Nationalism has been prag-
matically employed as an important resource for the formu-
lation of state ideology during the era of transition."(!ill This 
observation is echoed by Fan Baihua, who points to the 
Chinese Communist party-state's cynical and opportunistic 
use of nationalism to win the hearts of the people while the 
party-state assists foreigners in exploiting the Chinese peo-
ple for enormous profits. (>ZJ Xu Youyu has also acutely point-
ed out the distinct difference between Chinese nationalism 
in the 1990s and nationalism in modern Chinese history: the 
latter was a response to national crisis caused by foreign inva-
sion, whereas the former resulted from efforts by the party-
state to fill the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. l'3l 
Obviously, neither Chinese citizens nor Chinese "national 
interests" need to stand in opposition to the West. On the 
contrary, normal communication with the advanced West 
benefits the people and "national interests" of China in 
political, economic, and cultural development. It is the party-
· state that perceives a need to be an enemy of the liberal-
democratic West, particularly when nationalism has become 
an ideological pillar maintaining the totalitarian regime at 
the expense of democratisation in China. Given that the sta-
tist tradition has dominated educated minds in China since 
the birth of state Confucianism, and given that since the 
nineteenth century several generations of Chinese liberals 
have fallen into the trap of nationalism and brought tragedy 
upon themselves by abandoning their belief in liberalism for 
the sake of national salvation or national construction, the 
gathering momentum of Chinese liberalism today may con-
stitute the most profound change in Chinese intellectual 
development since the mid-nineteenth century, if not since 
the Spring-Autumn period. 
•conclusion 
The emergence of the liberal camp in China since the June 
4th massacre indicates an utter failure of the "anti-bourgeois 
liberalism campaign" launched by the Leninist party-state to 
root out the elements of liberalism. While Leninist hardlin-
ers in China have been moving backward since the June 4th, 
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Chinese political thought and society have been moving for-
ward. For the first time in Chinese history, liberalism is fully 
understood and has become the dominant ideology (zhuliu 
huayu) among thinking Chinese, who with few exceptions 
regard liberal democracy with regular ~ultiparty elections, 
rule of law, and protection of basic civil rights as a superior 
political system and an end goal for political development. 
Is the liberal camp capable of bringing down the Leninist 
party-state that stands in the way of China's transition to con-
stitutional democracy? In the conventional sense it is not, 
simply because under the post-totalitarian conditions it lacks 
the opportunity to form a powerful party or other form of 
political organisation to effect social and political change. 
However, its rigorous intellectual campaigns have laid down 
a solid intellectual foundation for China's transition to con-
stitutional democracy and have had an impact from the high-
est levels of the CCP to the bottom of Chinese society. The 
emerging rights defence movement is to a great extent the 
result of the propagation of liberalism and the expansion of 
rights consciousness in particular. The current CCP leaders, 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, have accepted liberal values 
such as human rights and rule of law as ~·universal values," 
although they have taken a self-contradictory position of pur-
suing democracy and the Leninist one-party dictatorship at 
the same time. The very concept of "the state respecting and 
protecting human rights" has now been written into China's 
revised constitution. The new political philosophy adopted 
by Hu and Wen is best embodied in the slogan "people as 
the end" or "people first" (yi ren wei ben), compared to pre-
vious party lines that treated people as means for other ends, 
as expressed in the slogan "class struggle as the key link" (yi 
jieji douzheng wei gang) or "development as the priority" 
(fazhan shi ying daoh). Subsequently, the idea of "putting 
people first" was further extended into and supplemented by 
the "scientific development concept" (541 and the theory of 
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Publishing House, 2000, pp. 381-88; Sun Liping, "Huiru shijie zhuliu wenming" (Joining 
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House, 2000. 
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"building harmonious society," which lists "democracy and 
rule of law" as the top criteria. css) At a press conference on 
16 March 2007, Wen Jiabao declared, "I said democracy, 
the rule of law, freedom, human rights, equality, and frater-
nity are not something peculiar to capitalism. They are the 
joint achievements of civilization of the entire world during 
its long historical process and the common values pursued by 
mankind." (561 The open discourse on liberalism is effectively 
disarming the Leninist party-state intellectually, ideological-
ly, and morally, and may in the end subdue it without a phys-
ical fight, as preached in Daoist strategies. • 
55. The idea of "building socialist harmonious society" was first put forward 
by Hu Jintao in a speech at a meeting with key officials at the provincial 
level in February 2005, and elevated in the Resolution about Some 
Major Issues of Building Socialist Harmonious Society at the 6th Plenary 
of the CCP National Congress in October 2006. The other five criteria are 
fairness and justice, honesty and fraternal love, full of vitality, stability 
and order, and harmony between humanity and Nature. 
56. "Full text of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao's news conference," 
http:/ /www.chinaelections.org/en/17 /03/2007. 
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